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ABSTRACT
New data compel a new view of events in the labor market during a recession. Unemployment rises
almost entirely because jobs become harder to find. Recessions involve little increase in the flow of
workers out of jobs. Another important finding from new data is that a large fraction of workers
departing  jobs  move  to  new  jobs  without  intervening  unemployment.  I  develop  estimates  of
separation rates and job-finding rates for the past 50 years, using historical data informed by detailed
recent data. The separation rate is nearly constant while the job-finding rate shows high volatility at
business-cycle and lower frequencies. I review modern theories of fluctuations in the job-finding
rate. The challenge to these theories is to identify mechanisms in the labor market that amplify small
changes in driving forces into fluctuations in the job-finding rate of the high magnitude actually
observed. In the standard theory developed over the past two decades, the wage moves to offset
driving forces and the predicted magnitude of changes in the job-finding rate is tiny. New models
overcome this property by invoking a new form of sticky wages or by introducing information and
other frictions into the employment relationship.
Robert E. Hall





The turnover view of unemployment has a ﬁrm grip on modern thinking about joblessness
in the United States. Unemployment occurs when a worker departs from a job and spends
time ﬁnding a new job. In addition, unemployment arises when a person looks for a new job
afteraperiodoutofthelaborforce. Job-seekersﬁndnewjobsatmonthlyratesrangingfrom
10 to 40 percent. Unemployment varies positively with the separation rate and negatively
with the job-ﬁnding rate.
For many years, students of the labor market believed that recessions—periods of
sharply rising unemployment—were the result of higher separation rates from jobs as well
as lower job-ﬁnding rates. In this view, a recession begins with a wave of layoffs, mainly in
cyclical durable-goods industries. As the labor market becomes clogged with job-seekers,
job-ﬁnding rates go down and the duration of unemployment rises. The second part of this
account is not in dispute. Much of this paper will focus on the large movements at cyclical
and sub-cyclical frequencies in the job-ﬁnding rate. But new research and new data have
challenged the ﬁrst part. The new view is that separations are not an important part of the
story of rising unemployment in recessions. Unemployment is high in a recession because
jobs are hard to ﬁnd, not because more job-seekers have been dumped into the labor market
by elevated separation rates.
Thenewviewputsthefocusonthehiringdecisionasthecentraltopicforunderstanding
cyclical variation in unemployment. The labor market goes through extended periods when
the number of new hires remains constant despite the availability of large numbers of job-
seekers. The surplus created by a new hire appears to be greater in those periods than when
unemployment is lower. Productivity is hardly cyclical, so the marginal product of a new
hire is as high as ever. The opportunity cost of a job-seeker is lower in a soft labor market.
The surplus arises from the gap between the marginal product and the opportunity cost. In
spite of the substantial joint gain from a hire, employers do not raise hiring rates during
periods of high unemployment. Slack labor markets persist for several years following a
2recession. The challenge to unemployment theory is to explain why hiring remains stable.
Arbitrage does not close the gap in the labor market as fast as it seems to in other markets.
In addition to experiencing periods of high unemployment following every recession, the
economy suffers from chronically high unemployment for extended periods, such as the
1970s and 1980s. These periods are equally puzzling.
I begin by documenting the surprising proposition that layoffs and other separations
do not rise during the time when output and employment are falling at the beginning of a
recession. The evidence is strongest for the most recent recession, thanks to a survey that
measures separations directly, across the entire economy. For earlier periods, the evidence
is less direct but reasonably compelling. I stress that the proposition does not mean that
employers make all employment adjustments through variations in hires and keep separa-
tions at a constant level independent of the need to adjust their employment levels. The
point is that the changes in separation rates that accompany employment changes at the
industry or aggregate level are tiny compared to the regular ﬂow of workers out of jobs.
Job-seekers are unemployed, out of the labor force, or employed in jobs they would
like to leave. I show that only a minority of new hires come from the unemployed. Hence
the measurement of a job-ﬁnding rate would ideally incorporate job-seekers in all three
statuses—unemployed, out of the labor force, or employed. Despite the importance of the
employed among job-seekers, I am unable to include them for lack of data. I am able to
include a group of those out of the labor force whose behavior is known to be similar to
those counted as unemployed. I then calculate a job-ﬁnding rate as the ratio of new hires
to my measure of job-seekers. The job-ﬁnding rate is highly cyclical—it plunges in every
recession. It also has important movements at lower frequencies—it was high in the 1960s
and 1990s and low in the 1970s and 1980s. One of my themes is that the subcyclical
movements of the job-ﬁnding rates are just as informative and puzzling as the cyclical
movements. A full understanding of the labor market requires a uniﬁed explanation of the
cyclical and sub-cyclical movements.
3The past few years have seen an explosion of new models of the job-ﬁnding process.
The models share some common features. In particular, information limitations constrain
the labor market. Job-seekers and employers are imperfectly informed about each others’
identities. A matching technology describes the random meetings of job-seekers and em-
ployers. In most of the models, the job-seeker and the employer make a bilateral wage
bargain after they meet each other. In the standard model, the wage turns out to be highly
responsive to conditions in the labor market. The wage adjusts immediately to exogenous
forces thought to be candidates as causes of recessions. The standard model has the clas-
sical property that these forces mainly alter the wage and have little effect on employment
and unemployment.
The recent discovery of the limited success of the standard model set off the explosion
ofresearchthatintroducesmechanismstoamplifytheresponseofunemploymenttodriving
forces. These models overturn the classical property of the standard model. Some of them
make the wage less responsive, while others keep the ﬂexible-wage property of the standard
model and achieve ampliﬁcation through other channels.
ThemodelsIdiscusshereareentirelyintheequilibriumtraditionofthestandardmodel.
The equilibrium property admits of a fairly precise deﬁnition—periods of high unemploy-
ment are not times when workers and employers could make simple bilateral deals that
would make both better off. In this respect, the models considered here differ from another
interesting branch of business-cycle theory that invokes sticky wages and prices that do
result in bilateral inefﬁciencies. Discussion of the relative roles of the equilibrium models
against disequilibrium models in the ultimate understanding of unemployment movements
is beyond my scope in this paper, though it is not a secret that I lean toward the equilibrium
models.
My review of new models of the job-ﬁnding process identiﬁes a long list of driving
forces and ampliﬁcation mechanisms that may play a role in the ultimate theory of the
dynamics of the aggregate labor market. The driving force that receives the most attention
4is productivity. Other forces that ﬁgure in most models include hiring costs, unemployment
compensation, the separation rate, and the real interest rate. Recent thinking has added the
shapes of distributions of match information private to employers or to workers, a wage
norm, and costs of delay during bargaining. I do not reach a strong conclusion about the
roles of the driving forces. Indeed, I rather suspect that the ultimate account of recessions
and other movements of unemployment will give weight to quite a few of them—recessions
are not the uniform result of a single cause.
2 The Separation Rate
The separation rate is the monthly rate of departure from jobs for all reasons: layoffs, quits,
ﬁrings, and the termination of time-limited employment. Although the distinctions among
the various types of separation are important for a full account of ﬂows in the labor market,
I will concentrate on the overall separation rate. I think it is a mistake to treat layoffs
and quits as if they were sharply distinguished. In the theory of turnover, a separation
occurs when it is no longer in the mutual interest of worker and employer to continue the
match. The layoff-quit distinction turns on institutional arrangements about who takes the
initiative in breaking the match. Models have not yet tackled systematically the question
of the design of these arrangements.
2.1 New survey data on separations
Knowledge of the behavior of separations advanced materially with the introduction of
an economy-wide survey of gross ﬂows in the labor market, the Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey (JOLTS). Each month a large stratiﬁed sample of employers report on
separations and hires. The survey began in December 2000, so it tracked the recession that
began in early 2001. Figure 1 shows the JOLTS separation rate and the standard unemploy-
ment rate from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The rise in unemployment through
























Figure 1. Separation and Unemployment Rates, December 2000 to October 2004
The JOLTS data show deﬁnitively that separations did not rise in the recession of 2001.
It would be a leap to conclude that separations were equally constant in earlier recessions
or even that they will remain constant in future recessions. The data in Figure 1 may reveal
only that the recession of 2001 was unique.
The breakdown of quits and involuntary separations (all categories of separations apart
from quits—mostly layoffs) at the bottom of Figure 1 shows, not surprisingly, that quits fell
during the contraction and involuntary separations (mainly layoffs) rose. But the magnitude
of these changes is small. The overwhelming message from Figure 1 is that the recession
























Natural resources and mining 3.17 1.79 0.59 0.7
Construction 5.76 1.04 0.43 5.0
Durable goods manufacturing 2.81 0.89 0.48 9.9
Nondurable goods manufacturing 2.90 0.36 0.21 6.4
Wholesale trade 2.53 0.27 0.17 4.8
Retail trade 4.39 0.37 0.16 12.1
Transportation, warehousing, and utilities 2.74 0.47 0.20 3.8
Information 2.37 1.72 0.32 2.4
Finance and insurance 1.85 0.18 0.14 4.6
Real estate and rental and leasing 3.10 0.22 0.12 1.5
Professional and business services 3.65 0.28 0.19 9.9
Educational services 1.79 0.40 0.19 1.5
Health care and social assistance 2.55 0.11 0.07 8.3
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 6.29 0.73 0.21 1.0
Accommodation and food services 6.26 0.24 0.11 7.5
Other services 3.18 0.22 0.14 3.9
Federal 1.23 1.10 0.32 2.8
State and local 1.23 0.27 0.16 13.8
Weighted average 3.23 0.69 0.26
Table 1. Separation Rates from JOLTS and Standard Deviation of Employment
Change
2.2 The roles of hiring and separations in adjusting the employment
level
Theﬁndingthattheseparationratehardlydeclinedduringtherecessionof2001saysalmost
nothing about how employment adjustments divide between hires and separations. The
ﬁnding says that the part of separations that reﬂects employment adjustment is small in
comparison to the general level of separations. Table 1 shows why this proposition has
to be true. It compares the average monthly separation rate from JOLTS to the standard
deviation of monthly employment changes as reported in the BLS payroll employment
data.
In the typical industry—as reﬂected in the weighted average reported in the last line of
7Table 1—more than three percent of workers depart employment each month. The standard
deviationofemploymentchange, ontheotherhand, isonlyabout0.7percent. Furthermore,
many of the larger monthly deviations are transitory, unlike the long sequence of declines
that occur in a recession. The standard deviation of employment changes over 12-month
spans, stated at monthly rates, is less than 0.3 percent. Even if all employment changes
occurred through changes in the separation rate and none through changes in hiring, the
changes in the separation rate would be close to invisible because of the high normal level
of separations.
Next I will present some results based on the hypothesis that JOLTS reveals behavior
that was stable over the period considered in this paper, 1948 to 2004. To generate a rough
approximation of separations for years before JOLTS, I regress the JOLTS separation rate
on industry employment-growth variables. Because an industry can expand rapidly only
by hiring and can contract rapidly only through separations, I include the positive part of
growth separately from the negative part.
I pooled the JOLTS data for the 18 industries listed in Table 1, jointly accounting for
all civilian employment, over the 46 available monthly observations. I used seasonally
unadjusted data for all variables (the BLS has not released seasonally adjusted data for
JOLTS at the industry level). The resulting estimate of the effect of negative industry
employment growth on separations is 0.29 with a standard error of 0.04 and the estimate
of the effect of positive industry growth is -0.05 with a standard error of 0.02. These
results conﬁrm asymmetry in a reduced form sense, but they do not deserve structural
interpretations, because there is no reason to expect that the disturbance in the equation is
uncorrelated with employment growth. The equation serves only its intended purpose of
measuring the expectation of separations conditional on employment growth.
Figure 2 displays the ﬁtted separations in terms of economy-wide aggregates, formed
by applying employment weights to the results by industry. I consolidate to the level of the
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Figure 2. Calculated Separation Rate and Components
ﬁgure shows 12-month centered moving averages. The smooth line labeled “component
from weighted industry constants” shows that the overall predicted separation rate rose
gradually over the period because of a change in the industry mix toward those with higher
constants in the regression. The line at the bottom shows the separations predicted from
employment change. It demonstrates the declining volatility that has attracted much recent
comment. Although the employment-change component had little role in the recessions of
1990-91 and 2001, it did make a noticeable contribution in earlier recessions. Notice that
the ﬁtted separation rate shows a small increase in 2000-2001, beginning just before JOLTS
became available.
2.3 Estimates of the entry rate to unemployment
About a ﬁfth of separated workers enter unemployment (see Table 2, below), so the entry
rate to unemployment sheds some light on the separation rate. Robert Shimer has made
9estimates of the entry rate from data from the Current Population Survey (Shimer (2005b)).
He concludes that there is little tendency for the rate to rise in recessions. He starts with
published data on total unemployment and on short-duration unemployment. The latter
serves as a measure of the ﬂow into unemployment. His procedure pays close attention to
issues of time aggregation. The relation between the inﬂow to unemployment and the stock
of unemployed reveals the exit rate from unemployment—the ﬂow probability of leaving
unemploymentbyﬁndingworkorleavingthelaborforce. Fromthestockofunemployment
and his calculated exit rate, he infers the entry rate.
The entry rate to unemployment measures the separation rate from employment if ev-
ery worker leaving a job becomes unemployed and if everybody becoming unemployed
was previously employed. Neither of these holds even as a ﬁrst approximation. Transi-
tions from jobs to new jobs without intervening unemployment are common and so are
transitions from employment to out of the labor force and from out of the labor force to
unemployment. Shimer (2005c) shows that the ﬂow from employment to out of the labor
force is not cyclical, though it has sub-cyclical trends. He also shows that the ﬂow from
out of the labor force to unemployment rises slightly in recessions, so removing it from his
measure of separations would strengthen his ﬁnding that the separation rate does not rise in
recessions. Finally, he shows that, during the time since the CPS was revised to include the
relevant question, job-to-job transitions fell during the one observed recession, in 2001.
Figure 3 shows Shimer’s calculated entry rate to unemployment. The rate jumped a
bit in some recessions, such as 1973-75 and 1981-82, but hardly increased at all in the
recessions of 1990-1991 and 2001.
2.4 Separations measured directly from ﬂows in the CPS
Closely related to Shimer’s approach is direct measurement of separations from the raw
data from the CPS (I am grateful to Shimer for providing his compilations of the data).






















Figure 3. Shimer’s Unemployment Entry Rate Calculated from the CPS
most months, one can match data for people reported in that month to data reported in
the previous month. Flows are inferred from differences in status reported in consecutive
months. As a result, random errors in measuring status raise the levels of the ﬂows. This
problem has impeded research on labor-market dynamics based on the CPS. Longitudinal
data overcome the problem—I discuss one important longitudinal survey below.
Starting in 1994, the CPS has provided a direct measure of separations—it added a
question for a person who has been at work in successive months whether it is for the
same or a different employer. Separations are the number of people who were at work in
one month and unemployed the next month plus the number at work in one month and
not in the labor force the next month plus those at work in both months but with different
employers. Figure 4 shows the ﬂows, as 12-month centered moving averages of seasonally
unadjusted data.



































Employment to New Job
Employment to out of Labor Force
Total Separation Rate
Figure 4. Separation Rate Measured in the CPS, 1994-2004
of about 7 percent per month is much higher than the rate shown in Figures 1 and 2 of
a bit over 3 percent. Separation rates are sensitive to the accounting period because a
small fraction of jobs but a large fraction of separations come from jobs lasting as little
as a day—see Hall (1995). Both surveys use the same accounting period, a month, so
the length of the accounting period cannot be a factor explaining the large discrepancy in
average separations. Rather, random errors in measuring status are the likely cause of the
discrepancy.
The CPS separation rate in Figure 4 shows no spike during the 2001 recession, con-
ﬁrming the ﬁnding of the JOLTS survey in Figure 1. The ﬂow from employment to un-
employment rose a bit during the recession while the ﬂow from employment to a new job
without intervening unemployment fell. This shift occurred because jobs became harder to
ﬁnd. The ﬂow from employment to out of the labor force—always surprisingly high—also





































































Employment to out of Labor Force
Sum
Figure 5. Flows out of Employment in the CPS, 1967-2004
Figure 4 shows the difﬁculty in measuring separations from the ﬂow into unemploy-
ment. Only about 20 percent of workers leaving employment become unemployed. The
remaining 80 percent are usually split about evenly between moving directly to new jobs
and leaving the labor force.
Nagyp´ al (2004a) has studied the CPS data on total separations in an econometric frame-
work that takes account of changes in demographic and industry mix. Her results conﬁrm
that there was no rise in separations in the recession in 2001.
The CPS did not report job-to-job transitions before 1994, but did report the other two
ﬂows out of employment, as shown in Figure 5. Notice that the sum does rise distinctly in
recessions. This appears to be the result of the omission of job-job transitions, which fall in
recessions. There is nothing in the CPS ﬂows data to suggest that total separations, includ-
ing the unmeasured job-job ﬂow, rise in recessions. The cyclical stability of separations





















Figure 6. Gottschalk and Mofﬁtt’s Separation Rate for While Males from SIPP
Reprinted with permission of the authors
The ﬂow of workers out of the labor force shown in the middle line of Figure 5 has a
pronounced downward trend through 1990. The employment to unemployment ﬂow trends
upward through the early 1980s. As a result, the sum is at a high level through the early
1980s and then declines. Part of this high level may be offset by lower job-job separations.
But there is some indication of a disagreement between the constancy of the separation rate
shown in Figure 2 (and the other data to be discussed shortly) and the CPS ﬂows.
2.5 Separation rates from the Survey of Income and Program Partic-
ipation
Gottschalk and Mofﬁtt (2000) compiled data from the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP) for the period 1983 to 1995 on monthly separation rates. Although the
SIPP contains data for only about 30,000 workers, its design is far better suited to the mea-
surement of labor-market transitions than is the CPS. Figure 6 shows the separation rate for
the single largest demographic group in the study, white males. Results for other groups
are quite similar.
The separation rate from the SIPP shows almost none of the discrepancy in overall level
relative to JOLTS found in the CPS. It also contradicts the downward trend in CPS sepa-
14rations in Figure 4. Except for bulges in 1985 and 1994, the SIPP separation rate supports
the hypothesis of constant separations. These bulges—both in years of high employment
growth when separations should be slightly lower, according to the earlier results—have no
obvious explanation.
2.6 Separation rates inferred from data on job tenure
Another useful source of information is a question about tenure that has appeared every few
years in the March CPS. The fraction of workers who started work recently is a measure
of the hiring rate. As noted earlier, differences between the hiring rate and the separation
are tiny, so the tenure data come close to revealing the separation rate. Although the CPS
records tenure in months if it is one year or less, I have not found a tabulation of the data
that reports the one-month ﬁgure separately, which is the measure most comparable to the
others I consider in this paper. Jaeger and Stevens (2000) tabulate fraction of workers with
tenure of one year or less, as shown in Figure 7. Higher monthly separation rates would
result in higher fractions of workers with short tenure. Except the one high ﬁgure in 1979,
the low-tenure fraction is close to constant. Again, I ﬁnd support for the view that the
separation rate has been constant over past decades, despite the higher apparent rate in the
CPS data.
Much additional research could be done on this point with existing sources. My tenta-
tiveconclusionisthataconstantseparationrateisthebestapproximationoverpastdecades.
But this conclusion comes from examining a number of sources, each of which shows
movement over the period, and ﬁnding that the movements are not correlated. The evi-
dence is not strong. And, of course, the constancy of the separation rate in Figure 2 is
virtually an assumption and should not be taken as conﬁrmation of constancy.
2.7 Relation between separations and job destruction



























Figure 7. Jaeger and Stevens’s Data on Tenure of One Year or Less from the
March CPS
16analysis. It is important to distinguish job destruction from separations. At the plant level,
job destruction occurs when employment shrinks—it is the separation rate less the hiring
rate, or zero, whichever is greater. At the aggregate level, the job-destruction rate is job
destruction divided by employment, averaged across all ﬁrms, including those creating
rather than destroying jobs.
The job-destruction rate is a close cousin of employment growth. To see this, consider
the following simple model at the plant level:
xi;t = zt + ²i;t: (1)
Here zt is the aggregate component and ²i;t is the plant-speciﬁc component of employment
growth xi;t. Suppose that ²i;t is identically distributed across plants and time with cdf F(²).
The implied job-destruction rate is
^ dt = E (max(¡x;0)) = ¡
Z ¡zt
¡1
(zt + ²)dF(²) = ¡ztF(¡zt) ¡ ¹(¡zt): (2)
Here ¹(¢) is the mean of ² truncated at the designated point. Thus the job-destruction rate
is a function of the aggregate component of employment growth alone.
Davis’s discussion following this paper calculates ^ dt and compares it to job destruction
measured directly from plant-level data, for manufacturing only. The version calculated
from employment growth, ^ dt, tracks job destruction quite well in most years, especially
recently. Itfallssomewhatshortforthebiggestspikes, intheseverecontractionsof1973-75
and 1981-82. As Davis explains, shifts of the distribution, notably increasing frequencies
of major employment reductions, occurred in these contractions.
The spike of job destruction that Davis and Haltiwanger ﬁnd in recessions does not
contradict the point I made at the beginning of this section that the shrinkage of employ-
ment during a recession is at such a low monthly rate in comparison to the usual level of
separations as to be essentially invisible. I note also that job destruction would occur in
a situation where all employment reductions took the form of reductions in the hiring rate
rather than increases in separations.
173 Unemployment and the Job-Finding Rate
Because the separation rate is close to constant—or at least does not rise in recessions—all
of the burden of explaining ﬂuctuations in the unemployment rate falls on variations in the
rate that job-seekers ﬁnd jobs. But there are many ways to measure the job-ﬁnding rate.
As the CPS ﬂows data demonstrate, workers often change jobs without visible intervening
unemployment. Thus there is a job-ﬁnding rate for job-holders. People often take jobs after
having been out of the labor force, so there is a job-ﬁnding rate for that group. And the
job-ﬁnding rate for the unemployed is a third important concept.
Ajob-ﬁndingrateistheratiooftheﬂowfromanotheractivityintoemployment, divided
by the number of people seeking to ﬁnd jobs. Finding the denominator for any job-ﬁnding
rate is a challenge. Only a minority of the employed are looking for work—most have
sufﬁciently strong comparative advantages in their current jobs so that the likelihood of
ﬁnding better jobs is small. A job-ﬁnding rate for the employed that took total employment
as the denominator would fail to record any signiﬁcant changes, given the constancy of the
numerator.
Finding a denominator for those out of the labor force encounters the same obstacles.
Most people not working or looking for work have a strong comparative advantage in some
non-work activity, so they are not looking for work.
Todealwiththisissue, Iproceedinthefollowingway. First, Idonotattempttomeasure
ajob-ﬁndingratefortheemployed. Ibelievethattheratebasedonadenominatorthatomits
employed job-seekers is the best available measure. When it is hard for the unemployed
or those out of the labor force to ﬁnd jobs, it is surely likely to be just as hard for those
thinking of leaving existing jobs to ﬁnd new jobs. This relation is an implication of the
various recent models incorporating on-the-job search discussed in a later section.
Second, I consider a measure of unemployment expanded to include people who are are
classiﬁed as out of the labor force in a given month, but are likely to move into the labor






Not in labor 
force 92.8 22.7 3.2
Unemployed 2.5 49.6 1.5
Working 4.7 27.6 95.4
From
To
Table 2. Transition Matrix for the CPS, 1967-2004, Percent per Month
Source: Robert Shimer’s tabulations of raw data from the CPS
tify this group—see Kodrzycki (2000). The group includes those classiﬁed as discouraged
workers, who want to work but believe no work is available for a variety of reasons. It also
includes marginally attached workers, who give reasons such as transportation problems or
child-care responsibilities that would indicate a likelihood of return to the labor force in the
near future.
Table 2 shows the reason for including people in the denominator who are classiﬁed
as out of the labor force but with high likelihoods of job-seeking. The table gives the
transition matrix in the CPS among the three states of not in labor force, unemployed,
and working. Each month, 7.2 percent of those classiﬁed as out of the labor force in the
previous month are in the labor force this month. About a third become unemployed and
two-thirds become employed. The high transition rate from out of the labor force directly
to employment suggests that some fraction of those classiﬁed as out of the labor force are
nonetheless effectively job-seekers. They ﬁnd jobs without passing through unemployment
even though they did not previously report any of the job-seeking activities that would have
placed them in the unemployment category in the CPS.
It would be desirable to validatethe inclusion of the extraunemployed in my measure of
expanded unemployment by tabulating the transition matrix for this concept, along with the
remaining group that is thought to be more ﬁrmly out of the labor force and the employed.



























Figure 8. Expanded Unemployment Rate
approximated it for earlier years by regressing it the standard unemployment rate for 1994
through 2004 and using the ﬁtted values for the years before 1994. The ﬁt over the 11
observed years is outstanding (R2 = 0:96). Although there is surely some drift in the
relation from 1948 through 1993, I doubt that this is nearly as large as the uncertainty
about the separation rate. Figure 8 shows the actual and imputed expanded unemployment
rate.
Figure 9 shows the job-ﬁnding rate calculated as the ratio of the new hires implicit in
Figure 2 to the number of job-seekers implicit in Figure 8. To calculate the numerator, I
add the separation rate and the rate of employment growth to get the new hire rate. Then
I multiply by the level of employment to get the number of new hires. To calculate the
denominator, I multiply the expanded unemployment rate by the expanded labor force.
The job-ﬁnding rate has quite remarkable volatility. It reached high levels in the tight labor





























































Figure 9. Calculated Job-Finding Rate
It plunged below 20 percent in the more severe recessions. The volatility of the job-ﬁnding
rate is a central fact for macroeconomics to explain.
3.1 Recruiting effort
A common feature of modern theories of the job-ﬁnding rate is that the market tightens
when the incentives for job-creation improve. Thus measures of recruiting effort and the
job-ﬁnding rate should move together. Figure 10 shows that this relationship is remarkably
strong. It shows the only measure of recruiting effort available over a long period, the
Conference Board’s index of help-wanted advertising in newspapers, along with the job-













































































Job-Finding Rate (Left Scale)
Index of Help-Wanted Ads (Right Scale)
Figure 10. Help-Wanted Advertising and the Job-Finding Rate
4 Economics of the Job-Finding Rate
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985) introduced the analysis of the
job-ﬁnding rate that permeates modern thinking. At its heart, the analysis considers unem-
ployment as the result of rent seeking. In that respect, the modern analysis is a reﬁnement
of the view in Harris and Todaro (1970) where a wage premium in cities attracts workers
from rural areas who form queues for urban jobs. In the modern view, holding a job has a
value above the value of the best alternative activity. Job-seekers are willing to spend time
looking for work because of the premium for employment.
Harris and Todaro proposed the simplest model of unemployment, the queue. A job-
seeker arriving in the city would join the end of a line and wait for jobs to open up for the
people ahead in the line before ﬁnding a job. The modern analysis reﬁnes this view a bit
by invoking a matching technology, but the basic role of the technology is the same as the
22role of the queue in Harris-Todaro.
The value that attracts job-seekers depends on the wage that workers receive upon em-
ployment. Thus a critical piece of the theory of the job-ﬁnding rate is the model of wage
determination. Until recently, the standard model was the Nash bargain. The worker’s
threat point is to continue searching rather than work for a candidate employer and the em-
ployer’s threat point is to deny the worker employment. The wage bargain places the parties
on a point partway between the threat points. To put it differently, the two parties have a
joint surplus, equal to the joint value they achieve from a match less their values at the
threat points. The Nash bargain splits the surplus between the parties in given proportions.
The standard setup includes a theory of separations, implicit in the wage-bargain model.
If the surplus of an existing match becomes negative, the parties will split up and a separa-
tion will occur. Because separations are not actually variable and because models with en-
dogenous separations have other unrealistic implications, many models assume a ﬁxed ex-
ogenous probability of separation, viewed as a probability that the productivity of a match
will plunge to zero and make the separation inevitable.
The standard theory of the job-ﬁnding rate, depicted in Figure 11, runs as follows:
Employers put resources into recruiting workers. They expand their efforts until the cost
of recruiting a worker exhausts the employer’s share of the surplus from employing the
worker. The job-ﬁnding rate depends on recruiting efforts of employers. The employer-
equilibrium curve in Figure 11 slopes upward because a higher surplus draws forth more
recruiting effort and creates a tighter labor market with a higher job-ﬁnding rate.
From the job-seeker’s perspective, a tighter labor market lowers the surplus. The sur-
plus is the difference between the value of the output that a match produces and the op-
portunity cost of the worker. The opportunity cost, in turn, depends on the ease of ﬁnding
a job—in a tight market with a high job-ﬁnding rate, the opportunity cost is higher and












Figure 11. Equilibrium in the Standard Model
The equilibrium of the labor market occurs at the intersection of the two curves. Notice
the key role of the Nash-bargain model of wage determination. The employer-equilibrium
curve deals with the employer’s share of the surplus and the job-seeker-equilibrium with
the job-seeker’s share. The Nash assumption locks the two together.
The dashed line in Figure 11 shows the effect of a three-percent decline in productivity.
The job-seeker-equilibrium curve shifts downward slightly, the job-ﬁnding rate drops a
little, and unemployment rises a bit. No shift occurs in the employer-equilibrium curve.
The shift in the job-seeker curve is small for the following reason: The surplus is the
difference between the present value of a worker’s product and the worker’s opportunity
cost. The opportunity cost depends mainly on the wage that would be paid by alternative
jobs. Under the Nash assumption, that wage falls almost as much as does productivity. The
surplus hardly changes. Shimer (2005a) was the ﬁrst to make this observation.
The ﬁnding of limited response of unemployment to changes in productivity suggests
thatthestandardtheoryisnotasatisfactoryaccountofﬂuctuationsinunemployment. Inthe
24typical recession, unemployment rises by several percentage points and remains high for
several years. No conceivable movement of productivity, when fed into the standard model,
could replicate the observed movements of unemployment in recessions. Shimer’s paper
setoffaquestforalternativemodelsthatcouldexplainthehighvolatilityofunemployment.
Mortensen (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) observe that Shimer’s result is
not universal—it rests on an assumption about labor supply. Shimer and I belong to the
school of macroeconomics that believes that alternative activities for most workers, includ-
ing unemployment compensation, are worth far less than the workers produce on the job.
The elasticity of labor supply is low. The fundamental driving force of the standard model
is the difference between productivity and the value of non-work. A given change in pro-
ductivity has a larger proportional effect on that difference if the value of non-work is close
to the level of productivity. The standard model can generate high levels of unemployment
volatility by setting the value of non-work only a bit below the level of productivity. The
rest of my discussion is for the beneﬁt of readers who share Shimer’s and my belief in
relatively inelastic labor supply.
5 Alternative Views of Wage Determination
Much of the effort focusing on creating a modern theory of unemployment ﬂuctuations
replaces the Nash bargain with some other model of wage determination.
5.1 Fixed wage
Job-ﬁnding and unemployment are highly sensitive to productivity if the standard model
is altered in just one way, by keeping the wage ﬁxed and unresponsive to changes in
productivity—see Shimer (2004). Figure 13 shows why. If the wage is ﬁxed, the sur-
plus received by the employer is the difference between the present value of the worker’s
product and the ﬁxed wage. The employer-equilibrium curve is unaffected, but job-seeker











Figure 12. Equilibrium in the Sticky-Wage Model
has a horizontal line showing the exogenous value of the surplus. In any reasonable view of
the labor market, most of the wage is earned as a rent, so the surplus is small in comparison
to the present value of the worker’s product. Consequently, a small proportional change in
productivity results in a large proportional change in the surplus. The downward shift of the
dashed line in Figure 13, corresponding to the same decline in productivity as in Figure 12,
is substantial. The new equilibrium has a much lower job-ﬁnding rate and correspondingly
high unemployment rate.
Hall (2005b) explores some aspects of the ﬁxed wage. Within certain fairly wide
bounds, a ﬁxed wage is an economic equilibrium. Earlier views of ﬁxed wages invoked
disequilibrium—the ﬁxed wage resulted in an inefﬁcient allocation of labor. Barro (1977)
pointed out that private inefﬁciency in bilateral economic relationships was paradoxical,
because a simple renegotiation could restore efﬁciency. The type of sticky wage I dis-
cussed does not result in inefﬁciency and is free from Barro’s critique, which I have long
26found utterly persuasive. In a matching model, the joint surplus measures the width of
the bargaining set for the wage. A sticky wage remains efﬁcient as long as it is within
the bargaining set. I derive conditions under which a sticky wage remains within the bar-
gaining set, even though the boundaries of the set ﬂuctuate along with productivity. These
conditions are not very restrictive.
As not a single reader of Hall (2005b) has failed to point out, the demonstration that a
sticky wage is an equilibrium is far from an explanation for stickiness. Many other patterns
of wage movement are equilibria, including ones that are more volatile than the Nash wage
and result in increases in unemployment when productivity falls. I do try to connect wage
inertia with the idea of a social norm. Still, the primary reason that the sticky-wage case is
interesting is the general impression that wages are, in fact, quite sticky.
The paper also makes the point that wages can be sticky relative to an index that grows
over time. The result is a more sophisticated model of wage inertia, similar to the model
implicit in many discussions of the Phillips curve and monetary non-neutrality.
GertlerandTrigari(2005)developanotherversionoftheequilibriumsticky-wagemodel.
Employers and workers make a standard Nash bargain that last many periods. Workers
hired between wage bargaining episodes receive the previously bargained wage. This setup
delivers the essential feature of the equilibrium sticky-wage model—the sensitivity of the
employer’s gain from a new hire to current economic conditions. The wage does not re-
spond immediately to those conditions. Unemployment is sensitive to driving forces until
the next wage bargain. The persistence of unemployment ﬂuctuations depends on the du-
ration of wage bargains.
5.2 Kennan’s model
Kennan (2005) considers the standard model with the following alternative model of wage
determination: Upon forming a candidate match, the parties toss a coin to decide who will
make an offer to the other. If the employer wins the toss, the employer offers the job-
27seeker her reservation wage. If the winner, the job-seeker has a more complicated decision,
because the job-seeker’s productivity is known to the employer but is hidden from the job-
seeker. The job-seeker is in the same position as a bidder in a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction.
Kennan makes assumptions that cause the job-seeker to bid a wage that is insensitive to
current conditions. Thus he reaches a sticky-wage property as a derived conclusion rather
than as a bald assumption, a step forward. Kennan’s model delivers a high sensitivity of
unemployment to changes in productivity for the reasons shown in Figure 12.
The sticky-wage conclusion is a special feature of the setup of his model. The hidden
information is binary—match productivity is either high or low. The job-seeker knows the
two values but does not know which one holds. Kennan assumes an environment where
the job-seeker always picks the lower value, thus guaranteeing employment but giving
the employer a large part of the surplus when the realization is the higher value of match
productivity. Increases in aggregate productivity take the form of a higher probability of
the better level of match productivity, but not enough higher to cause any job-seeker to bid
higher. Thus a sticky wage is essentially built into the model.
In a more general version of the model, the job-seeker knows that match productivity
can take on many values or is a continuous random variable. In that case, the job-seeker
will make a higher bid when conditions are better, using the general principles of ﬁrst-price
auction theory. In another variant of this type of model, the wage might be determined by
a different procedure, such as a double auction where both employer and job-seeker make
bids. Tawara (2005) generalizes wage determination in Kennan’s model.
Kennan’s emphasis on informational rents that vary over time is an important contribu-
tion to the theory of ﬂuctuations in the job-ﬁnding rate. When rents earned by employers
are high, ﬁrms will invest more heavily in recruitment efforts and the market will tighten,
with higher job-ﬁnding rates. Further work in this area may demonstrate that variation in
informational rents might plausibly be large enough to explain observed ﬂuctuations. It
needs to elucidate how the exogenous events that trigger recessions cause reductions in
28rents and thus bring higher unemployment.
5.3 Reconsideration of the threat points in the wage bargain
Hall and Milgrom (2005) point out that the threat points considered in the standard labor-
market bargaining model are not credible. Once a qualiﬁed worker and an employer have
met and found that they would enjoy a joint surplus, the threats to disclaim the match are
hollow. The sequential bargaining framework of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986)
considers alternative, credible threats. The parties alternate in making wage proposals to
each other. The threat point of each is to prolong bargaining by declining an offer and
making a counteroffer. Each understands the implications of the process, so the unique
equilibrium is an immediate Nash-type bargain in which the threat points are the payoffs to
delaying indeﬁnitely.
Changing the standard model in only one respect—changing the threat points to the
payoffs to endless delay—has a profound effect. The wage becomes fully insulated from
conditions in the labor market, such as unemployment. The wage does respond to produc-
tivity, but only half as much as in the standard model. The result is a strong response of
unemployment to productivity and other driving forces. The wage no longer has an equili-
brating role. If productivity falls, the part of the surplus accruing to employers falls sharply
and they cut back on recruiting effort. The labor market softens dramatically.
We also consider two variants in which the wage is more closely connected to unem-
ployment, though not as strongly as in the standard model. First, we alter the matching
framework so that, part of the time, more than one applicant bargains with an employer for
a job opening. If there is a single applicant, the parties engage in the bargaining process
just described. If there are more applicants, they engage in Bertrand competition for the
opening and one of them winds up with the job, but is only paid his reservation wage. The
employer gains all of the surplus. Because the likelihood of competition is greater in a soft
labor market, recruiting effort equilibrates the market more aggressively with this modiﬁ-
29cation. Nonetheless, the model delivers a higher response of unemployment to productivity
and other ﬂuctuations than does the standard model.
In the second variant, there is a small probability that a worker will take another job
during the process of bargaining with a prospective employer. Again, this modiﬁcation
links the wage to conditions in the labor market, but does not completely undo the effect of
using credible threat points in the basic wage-bargaining model.
6 Models that Explain Job-Finding Volatility with Flexi-
ble Wages
Research has been active recently in trying to meet the challenge of Shimer (2005a) without
invoking sticky wages directly. In some cases, low wage volatility is a conclusion derived
from the fundamentals.
6.1 Models with on-the-job search
Figure 3 shows that the job-to-job ﬂow accounts for almost half of all separations in normal
times. No theory of labor-market dynamics could possibly be complete without consider-
ation of this key ﬂow. Many job-seekers are recorded as employed, not unemployed. A
number authors have created models with on-the-job search—one of the most prominent is
Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Prior to the search for ampliﬁcation mechanisms launched
by Shimer, these models tended to deliver even less job-ﬁnding volatility than did the basic
Mortensen-Pissarides model—see Nagyp´ al (2004b).
Nagyp´ al combines on-the-job search with a number of other key ingredients to achieve
quite substantial ampliﬁcation relative to the Mortensen-Pissarides model where workers
search only after losing jobs. First, employers need to prefer recruiting people directly out
of other jobs rather than from the unemployed. In the standard model, employers have
the opposite preference because the likelihood of forming a match with a candidate who is
30unemployed is higher than with a candidate who has a job. The latter has a higher reser-
vation wage. In a recession, when the mix of job-seekers shifts towards the unemployed,
employers intensify recruiting efforts on account of the more favorable mix. This factor
results in the attenuation of the already low response of the job-ﬁnding rate to changes in
productivity.
To reverse this effect, Nagyp´ al introduces heterogeneity in job matches. Workers have
different satisfaction levels with their jobs, hidden from employers. Workers hired from
unemployment are less desirable because those who form matches will have a lower aver-
age job satisfaction. They are more likely to leave the job soon as they search for better
jobs while employed. The ﬁnal key element is a ﬁxed cost of training a new worker. A quit
deprives the employer of the value of the training cost. Nagyp´ al suggests that it is plausible
that the costs from the higher turnover of workers hired from the unemployed considerably
more than offsets the easier recruitment of the unemployed.
If the offset is strong enough, the mix effect goes in the opposite direction from earlier
modelswithon-the-jobsearch. InNagyp´ al’scalibration, theelasticityoftheunemployment
rate with respect to productivity is about ¡5. A decline of productivity of one percent raises
the unemployment rate by about 0.3 percentage points. Although this is quite a bit more
than in the standard model, it still requires implausibly large shocks to explain the increase
in unemployment of two or three percentage points in the typical recession.
Krause and Lubik (2004), working independently from Nagyp´ al, present a different
model of ampliﬁcation from on-the-job search. Their model permits variations in the in-
tensity of on-the job-search, a feature also present in Nagyp´ al’s. Search effort of workers
intending to move directly to better jobs is highly elastic. When a persistent but ultimately
temporary productivity shock hits the economy, the stock of workers who ﬁnd it newly
desirable to look for higher-wage jobs rises. During the fairly long period before these
workers actually move, wages do not rise as much as productivity. The surplus available
to employers—the difference between productivity and the wage—remains high for an
31extended period. Through the standard mechanism of the Mortensen-Pissarides class of
models, the higher surplus to employer stimulates recruiting effort and tightens the labor
market. Endogenous wage stickiness delivers a result in their model similar to the one
reported for exogenous wage stickiness in Shimer (2005a).
The Krause-Lubik view calls for high volatility of job-job ﬂows. They show that quits
asrecordedintheoldmanufacturingturnoversurveywerequitevolatile, butdonotmention
the direct measure of the job-job ﬂow shown in Figure 2. In their model, as the market
tightened from slack conditions in 1994 to extremely tight conditions in 2000, the job-job
ﬂow should have risen. Instead, it fell a small amount.
6.2 Shimer and Wright’s model with hidden information and hidden
action
Shimer and Wright (2004) develop a model of the labor market featuring numerous sub-
markets. All the employers in a sub-market offer the same contingent employment contract
to workers who choose to enter the sub-market. Workers know the terms of the contracts
in all of the sub-markets and pick the sub-market offering the most favorable contract.
Having chosen a sub-market, the job-seeker encounters a standard matching technology
which delivers a ﬂow probability of meeting an employer and entering into a contract.
The contracting problem has an action hidden from employers—the investment that the
worker makes in establishing the relationship—and information hidden from workers—the
productivity of the resulting match. The contract needs to provide an incentive for the
worker’s effort. The only tool that the employer can use to induce effort is to make pay
contingent on productivity. To make use of this tool, the employer has to make a credible
announcement of productivity, a variable the worker does not observe directly. The contract
embodies incentives for truthful disclosure by the employer to achieve credibility. The
distribution of match-speciﬁc productivity is a key object in the model. Under reasonable
restrictions on the distribution, the equilibrium contract is a lump sum plus a bonus if the
32ﬁrm asks the worker to work, after observing and announcing the worker’s productivity.
Shimer and Wright make important advances on the earlier literature on employment
contracts with hidden action and hidden information. They mention some reasons that the
model may help explain the volatility of the job-ﬁnding rate and unemployment. The model
has a threshold that is absent from the standard model. Volatility may be higher because
changes in the environment move ﬁrms past the threshold. But the paper does not measure
the resulting volatility—the authors are still working on that task.
6.3 Self-selection
Hall (2005a) considers a rather different hidden-information problem in the labor market.
A job-seeker is either qualiﬁed or not qualiﬁed for a particular job. She has information
about her likelihood of being qualiﬁed prior to applying for a job with an employer. That
information is hidden from employers until they test and otherwise evaluate a job appli-
cant. Making an application is costly to the applicant. Job-seekers set a cutoff level of the
likelihood and apply for every job that meets the cutoff. Employers know the fraction of
applicants who are qualiﬁed and expand job openings up to the point that the surplus they
enjoy from testing and hiring the average applicant exhausts the testing cost. Job-seekers
are in equilibrium when the anticipated share of the surplus exhausts the application cost.
Once an applicant is tested and found qualiﬁed, the job-seeker and employer make the
standard Nash bargain.
Thekeydeterminantofequilibriuminthelabormarketinthemodelisthecutofflevelof
the qualiﬁcation likelihood. The equilibrium is fragile because a higher cutoff is beneﬁcial
to both job-seekers and employers. The equilibrium is at the intersection of two curves in
surplus-cutoff value space and the two curves may have almost the same slope. If the cutoff
level is low, the market is in an undesirable equilibrium—employers are receiving large
numbers of applications from unqualiﬁed workers. Employers recruit correspondingly less,
sothemarketisslack. Inaslackmarket, job-seekerssetlowcutoffsbecausejobsarehardto
33ﬁnd. When the cutoff level is high, the market equilibrium induces efﬁcient self-selection.
Employers hire enthusiastically because each costly test is likely to yield a new employee
who is qualiﬁed. Workers set high cutoffs because jobs are easy to ﬁnd.
This description suggests that the equilibrium is indeterminate, which is deﬁnitely a
possibility and is not a borderline case. If the equilibrium is determinate and satisﬁes a
standard stability condition, the equilibrium is fragile—it responds sensitively to driving
forces.
Thedrivingforcesthatalterthecutoffqualiﬁcationlevelandthusthejob-ﬁndingratedo
not include productivity. Shifts in productivity alter the employer’s and worker’s surplus
in proportion so the intersection in cutoff-surplus space occurs at the same cutoff level.
The most interesting potential driving force is a property of the probability distribution
of the signal that job-seekers receive about the likelihood of qualiﬁcation for a job. The
property is the relation between the cutoff level adopted by the job-seeker and the average
likelihood of qualiﬁcation of applicants employing the rule of applying for every job where
the information conveys a likelihood at least as high as the cutoff. The latter controls the
employer’s payoff from testing. The elasticity of the ratio of the two is key. If the elasticity
is one, equilibrium is indeterminate. Small changes in the elasticity are a potent driving
force for large ﬂuctuations in the job-ﬁnding rate and other aspects of the labor market.
7 Synthesis
Table 3 lists the full set of driving forces identiﬁed in the standard model and in the recent
literature revising the standard model to increase the predicted amplitude of unemployment
ﬂuctuations. For some entries, I will have little more to say, because data are lacking.
Productivity is a natural choice of driving force, partly because of the attention that the
real-business-cycle literature has given to it, generally in models that lack any treatment of
unemployment. In the standard model, higher productivity results in lower unemployment




Real interest rate Standard
Unemployment compensation Standard
Leisure value during search Standard
Separation rate Standard
Match value information hidden from employer Self-selection, on-the-job search
Application cost incurred by job-seeker Self-selection 
Match value information hidden from job-seeker Shimer-Wright, Kennan
Wage norm Hall
Job-seeker's payoff during bargaining Hall-Milgrom
Employer's cost of delay during bargaining Hall-Milgrom
Table 3. Driving Forces Identiﬁed in Models of the Labor Market
ployers to create jobs. As Shimer demonstrated, wage increases take away almost all the
increase, so the effect is small in the standard model. In the variations from the standard
model I discussed earlier, the effect of productivity changes is much greater because the
take-back through wages is smaller or is absent altogether.
Fitting productivity as a driving force into a coherent account of 50 years of unem-
ployment ﬂuctuations faces some challenges. Productivity rose dramatically over the pe-
riod, while unemployment has been roughly steady. One would need a trend in some
other driving force to offset the effect of growth in productivity to explain the stability of
unemployment—the likely choice is the value of leisure time to job-seekers. Mechanisms
similar to those in real-business-cycle models might deliver a relationship between the rate
of growth of productivity and unemployment. The data show a weak relationship, as shown
in Figure 13. Shimer (2005a) has a ﬁgure suggesting a much tighter relationship, based on
HP-ﬁltered data. I take the more ambitious view that the model should be able to explain
the lower-frequency movements that the HP ﬁlter removes.
The role of the real interest rate in the standard model and its variants remains largely
unexplored. One reason is that it has proven difﬁcult to generate movements of real rates in






















Figure 13. Productivity Growth and Unemployment
gives the real rate an important role in a model based on rather different principles. In the
standard model, a higher real rate raises unemployment by decreasing the present value of
the employer’s part of the surplus, which is the difference between productivity and the
wage. Employers recruit less actively in the face of the lower present value.
Figure 14 suggests that the real rate deserves further consideration as a driving force.
The horizontal axis is the one-year Treasury bill rate at the beginning of the year less the
rate of growth of the consumption deﬂator over the year—it is the realized real rate. The
relationship has a noticeable and statistically unambiguous upward slope. But explanation
of the high volatility of the real rate has eluded general-equilibrium modelers to date.
The role of unemployment compensation in the determination of unemployment is
straightforward in any model—subsidizing the activity creates more of it. Figure 15 shows
the relation over the past 50 years between the replacement rate for unemployment com-
pensation and the standard unemployment rate. I measure the numerator of the replacement






















Figure 14. Real Interest Rate and Unemployment
nomic Report of the President to the number of unemployed reported in the CPS. I measure
the denominator as compensation per worker as reported in the U.S. National Income and
Product Accounts. The ﬁgure shows no obvious relationship. In particular, the replacement
rate was unusually low in the 1980s, a decade of high unemployment.
Some of the new models emphasize the shapes of distributions of hidden information.
In the self-selection and on-the-job-search models, employers make decisions knowing the
shape of a distribution of job-seeker characteristics, but not the hidden value for a particular
job-seeker. In the Shimer-Wright and Kennan models, job-seekers make decisions in the
reverse setting. For example, in Kennan’s model, a job-seeker makes a wage demand
without knowing the employer’s reservation wage based on hidden match productivity.
This type of model opens the possibility of subtle driving forces involving changes in the
shapes of those distributions.
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Figure 15. Unemployment Compensation Replacement Rate and Unemployment
conomist’s notion of a recession and the class of theories considered in this paper. When
asked to describe a particular recession or recessions in general, the practical macroe-
conomist will omit mention of any of the forces in Table 3. Instead, the story will fo-
cus on the collapse of purchases of certain categories of products—producer and con-
sumer durables. For example, all practical accounts of the recession of 2001 emphasize
the huge decline in high-tech investment. In earlier recessions, declines in home-building
were prominent features.
Table 4 shows the changes in employment that occur in various industries from the
peak to the trough, as determined by the NBER. The data conﬁrm the uneven effects of
the forces that cause recessions. Construction, durables, and non-durables manufacturing
suffer large employment reductions, while other industries shrink only slightly or continue
to grow.











Prof. and bus. services -0.9
Ed. and health services 2.1
Leisure and hospitality -0.3
Other services 1.7
Government 1.4
Table 4. Peak-to-Trough Employment Changes by Industry, Averages over Reces-
sions, 1948-2001
39the industry composition of employment to the aggregate unemployment rate. As Section
2 of this paper documented, the ﬂows of separations corresponding to the employment
changes in Table 4 are insigniﬁcant in comparison to the normal ﬂows of separations. The
rise in unemployment is the result of diminished job-creation among employers in general.
The new additions to the DMP class of models may offer some hope of linking the
facts in Table 4 to the dramatic rise in unemployment that accompanies every recession.
For example, the events leading to a large decline in employment in durables might shift
the economy from the favorable equilibrium described in the self-selection model to the
unfavorable one. In the favorable equilibrium, the applicants for a job opening are largely
people who know they are qualiﬁed. Employers waste few resources screening out unsuit-
able applicants. They are correspondingly enthusiastic about creating jobs, so the market
is tight. A subtle change in the distribution of the signal that workers receive about their
likelihood of qualiﬁcation can move the equilibrium perversely. Applicants, ﬁnding it dif-
ﬁcult to locate any job, apply for jobs where they are less likely to be qualiﬁed. Employers
are overwhelmed by applicants and dissipate resources screening out the unqualiﬁed ones.
The market becomes slack, with high unemployment.
In Kennan’s model, the shape of the distribution of match productivity, a variable ob-
served only by the employer, has two key roles. Job-seekers know the distribution but not
the realization, so they solve a wage-bidding problem deﬁned by the distribution. Firms
earn an informational rent on the difference between the productivity realization and the
wage bid. Shifts in the distribution induced by changes in the composition of employment
might result in changes in the rent.
Shimer and Wright’s model also has a distribution of individual productivity where the
realization is hidden from the worker. Changes in the shape of this distribution may have
important effects on the equilibrium job-ﬁnding rate in the model.
The successful model of ﬂuctuations in the job-ﬁnding rate will incorporate on-the-job
search, as emphasized by Nagyp´ al and Krause-Lubik.
408 Concluding Remarks
The job-ﬁnding rate is the key variable in understanding the large ﬂuctuations in unemploy-
ment over the past 50 years. The separation rate, the other determinant of unemployment,
has been stable, by all the available evidence. Movements of the job-ﬁnding rate occur at
cyclical frequencies—the rate plunges in every recession. Movements also occur at low
frequency—the rate remained low even at the peaks in the 1950s and early 1960s and again
in the 1970s through the end of the 1980s.
Research has not yet settled on the exogenous driving forces that cause the secular
and cyclical movements of the job-ﬁnding rate. Productivity and the real interest rate are
modestly correlated with unemployment. New theories have added to the list of driving
forces, including some that raise interesting measurement challenges.
Recent thinking has added many ampliﬁcation mechanisms that help explain the strong
response of unemployment to what appear to be small changes in exogenous driving forces.
Wage stickiness is moderately plausible as an explanation of the movements of the job-
ﬁndingrateoverperiodsofayearortwo. Thesubstantialswingsoflabor-marketconditions
over longer periods seem beyond this explanation. More subtle changes in the economic
environment seem promising ways to explain the movements of the job-ﬁnding rate at both
cyclical and subcyclical frequencies.
The business cycle appears to be a complicated phenomenon. I am convinced that
the labor market is the place to look for an understanding of the depth and persistence
of recessions. The turnover view is surely helpful in understanding these issues. The
explosionofrecentresearchonampliﬁcationmechanismsseemstobeleadinginadirection
that will create a rich theory capable of explaining the volatility and amplitude of cyclical
and other ﬂuctuations in the job-ﬁnding rate.
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